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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to assess, from an empirical point of view, the relative 
explanatory capacities of two hypotheses that address the link between economics 
and religion: the religious markets and the secularization hypothesis. First, we 
estimate a baseline model that takes into account both hypotheses jointly. 
Secondly, we study in a separate way the influence of socio-economic 
development and market structure. Finally, we investigate the relationship 
between group size and religious commitment. Overall, the results suggest some 
supporting evidence for the predictions derived from the hypothesis of religious 
markets that emphasize the overriding importance of the degree of competition as 
a determinant factor of religious behaviours. 
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1. - Introduction.  
The study of Religion has a long tradition in sciences like Sociology, 
Psychology, Anthropology and even Political Science. The predominant paradigm 
in these approaches is known as "the hypothesis of secularization".1 The deductive 
logic of this theory is remarkably clear: economic development entails income 
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growth, higher levels of education, urbanization and life expectancy, as well as 
changes in natality and demographic structure. All these transformations would 
lead to a gradual reduction in religious practice and in the demand of religious 
services.  
 The Economics of Religion, as an economic analysis of the religious 
behaviours and markets, constitutes an alternative perspective. There is a 
significant literature which assumes as a starting point the analogy between 
religious and economic behaviour in such a way that religions and institutions 
performance would be explicable with market categories. A sampling of such 
works includes Stark and Bainbridge (1987); Baimbridge and Whyman (1997), 
Iannaccone (1991, 1997 and 1998), Smith, Sawkins and Seaman (1998) and, more 
recently, Smith and Sawkins (2003), North and Gwin (2004).  
The present paper seeks to provide empirical foundations for opposing 
both the secularization and the religious markets hypotheses. In order to 
investigate separately the relationship between religious participation, 
socioeconomic development and market concentration the paper is organized as 
follows. After assessing the validity of the secularization hypothesis, we develop 
an empirical contrast of two additional hypotheses derived from the hardcore of 
the religious markets paradigm. First, we test if higher competition between 
denominations gives rise to a higher efficiency in the provision of religious 
services. Secondly, we investigate if the organizations smaller in size or with a 
smaller market share are more efficient. Finally we summarize the main 
conclusions.  
                                                                                                                                                              
1
 For a review of the literature about secularization hypothesis see Wilson (1982) 
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 2. Determinant factors of religious participation 
Our empirical analysis about the determinant factors of religious 
participation uses data on participation, belief and market share of 58 countries 
with different religious traditions. The set of data was obtained from the World 
Values Survey 1995-1999 (2000). Participation in the communitarian 
celebrations, measured as the percentage of individuals who claim to attend the 
religious services at least once a week, is chosen as a proxy of religious demand 
and commitment with the congregation.  
In the baseline case, we assume that religious participation depends on 
both the secularisation process and market structure. Specifically,  
Pj = α + βHDIj + γHj   [1] 
where Pj is the level of religious participation in country j, HDIj (Human 
Development Index) is the indicator of socioeconomic development of country j 
that incorporates the factors emphasized by the secularization hypothesis 
(education, income and life expectancy); Hj is an Herfindahl index defined as 
∑=
i
ijj SH
2
, where ijS  is the share of the religious market of confession i in country 
j. The values of the market concentration index are indicative of the size of 
confession in a market. In turn, that index is a measure of the diversity of 
confessions within a market and, consequently, it can be considered as a proxy of 
competition levels.  
This regression model shows both variables the socioeconomic 
development (HDI) and market concentration (H) as significant (see model 1 in 
table 1). To investigate this issue further, the model specification is modified 
introducing a dummy variable in order to differentiate between Catholic and 
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Islamic traditions and other confessions. This distinction of dominant 
denominational traditions becomes relevant; indeed, countries with a Catholic or 
Islamic majority reveal a greater level of participation (models 2 and 3). 
Nevertheless, these results do not allow for any discrimination between the 
respective explanatory capacities of both paradigms the secularization and the 
religious markets hypotheses. 
 
 [Table 1] 
 
2.1 Secularization hypothesis 
Verification of the secularization hypothesis would imply the existence of 
a significant negative relation between the religious participation and 
socioeconomic development. Then,  
jj HDIaP β+=         [2] 
 
The results of estimating equation [2] provide some weak evidence in 
favour of the secularization hypothesis (model 4).2 Furthermore, there is stronger 
evidence supporting the predictions of the secularization hypothesis in countries 
with a Catholic and Islamic tradition (model 5). 
2.2. Religious market hypothesis 
If it is assumed that a single confession is unable to reflect all religious 
demands, 3  it is possible to advance the hypothesis that an increase of competition 
                                                          
2
 See Barro and McCleary (2003) for some empirical evidence on the influence of factors such as 
education and urbanization on religious participation. 
 
3
 Isaacs and Laband (1999) find some evidence on the relationship between social heterogeneity 
and religious pluralism. Baimbridge and Whyman (1997) also suggest the existence of supply-side 
effects on religious demand.  
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in religious markets will cause a greater level of religious participation and, 
therefore, it would improve the efficiency in the provision of religious services. 
According to this hypothesis, religious participation (Pj) would be a function of 
market concentration expressed through a Herfindahl index (Hj): 
jj HaP β+=   [3] 
If there is a negative relation between the religious participation and the 
degree of concentration of this market, participation will be smaller in those 
contexts in which the religious markets are monopolized or subsidized by the 
State (Public Religion) than in a situation of free competition.4  
At first glance, the correlation between religious participation and market 
concentration is practically non-existent (model 6). However, as we did before, it 
is necessary to consider different market structures. In particular, the evidence 
reflected in table 3 suggests the existence of two general sorts of religious market 
management. The first type refers to non-Catholic and non- Islamic countries and 
it can be defined as an open market model in which monopoly and public religion 
seem to cause weak commitment levels (model 8). The second type is a 
framework in which  the Catholic Church or the diverse Islamic confessions 
generate high levels of participation in spite of being official or semi-official 
religious (model 7).  
The results corresponding to the specification of model 8 also allow us to 
conclude that in non-catholic and non-islamic countries (with a lutheran and 
calvinist tradition as well as in Anglo-Saxon and Ortodox countries) the 
hypothesis of  religious markets is verified.  Moreover, the degree of competition 
                                                          
4
 By contrast, the results obtained by Hull and Bold (1998) appear to contradict the standard 
religious markets hypothesis. 
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in the market is also the main factor determining participation and group 
commitment. 
Overall, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of the religious 
markets and the secularization processes in Catholic and Islamic countries. On the 
other hand, in those countries involved in secularization processes, a high level of 
market concentration and the existence of monopolies seem to favour a stronger 
religious commitment.  
2.3. Commitment and group size.  
An additional hypothesis derived from the religious markets paradigm can 
be formulated as follows: Assuming the non-existence of scale economies in 
provision of religious services, religious groups will generate a greater level of the 
commitment among their members the smaller their share in the religious market. 
To investigate the relationship between commitment and size of the group we 
regressed to the following equation:  
ijij ScP γ+=                    [3] 
where Pij  is the religious participation in group i of country j and Sij is the market 
share of congregation i.  
The main results of the econometric estimation of equation [3] support the 
existence of an inverse relation between the congregation’s relative size (market 
share) and the levels of individuals’ commitment and religious participation 
(model 9). If we run a regression for those countries in which Catholic and 
Islamic are not majority traditions, the explanatory capacity of market share 
increases to the extent that the most important effects on religious behaviour are 
associated with this factor (model 10). 
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3.- Conclusions. 
This paper provides preliminary results as supporting evidence for the 
predictions that emerge from the economic approach that emphasises the 
relationship between a religious market structure and religious behaviour. In 
particular, the empirical outcomes reflect the existence of a causal and direct link 
between the level of competition in the religious markets and the levels of 
religious participation and commitment. 
The results obtained do not allow us to reject the hypothesis of 
secularization, but to put forward an alternative hypothesis (the religious market 
hypothesis) that would constitute a progress in understanding the relation between 
economics and religion. This is because the latter hypothesis has a comparable 
explanatory capacity of the evolution of the demand for religion, but, unlike the 
former one, it could also explain the evolution of religious participation.  
Some of the specific features observed in the catholic and the Islamic are 
entirely consistent with the premises of the religious markets hypothesis.  Both 
traditions do not constitute a monopoly and do not strictly adjust to the pattern of 
the model of public religion. In fact, they have allowed a surprising diversity of 
practices (orders and congregations) and levels of membership that could be  
considered as a substitute of competition. However, the advances in the processes 
of secularization in Catholic and Islamic countries along with a higher religious 
pluralism could change the market structures.   
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TABLE 1: Determinants of religious participation 
 Baseline case Participation vs. H.D.I Participation vs.  competition Participation vs. market share 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Market concentration (H) -32.255* -42.675**    -32.024*     
Log (Market concentration)   -23.038**    26.560**    
HDI -68.54** -73.909** -71.543** -93.605** -72.541**      
Confession * market 
concentration        33.668**    
LOG(market concentration) 
(non catholic, non islamic)        - 35.32451**   
LOG( Market share)         -0.074818**  
LOG (Market share)  
( non catholic, non islamic) 
         -0.100664** 
Catholic and Islamic  19.26** 19.649**  15.862**      
C 98.248** 102.191** 61.356** 101.5217** 78.248** 42.866**  -9.104255** 0.203504** 0.103746** 
R2 0.188 0.365 0.402 0.226031 0.28210 0.075348 0.432400 0.511597 0.270516 0.415616 
R2 Adjusted 0.158 0.330 0.369 0.210236 0.26321 0.058837 0.421271 0.492060 0.266395 0.411693 
Durbin-Watson  2.14 1.870 1.825 1.859726 1.921005 2.226.7 2.071141 1.913512 1.595812 1.728768 
Prob(F) 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000422 0.00003 0.0370 0.000000 0.000028 0.000000 0.000000 
Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 30 172 152 
*indicates statistically significat at 5% level; ** at 1% 
 
